Cash Transfers and Child Labour: An Intriguing Relationship by Guilherme Issamu Hirata
overty Centre P
INTERNATIONAL
The content of this page does not  necessarily reflect the official views of the
International Poverty Centre, IPEA or the United Nations Development Programme.
International Poverty Centre (IPC)
SBS – Ed. BNDES, 10º andar
70076 900  Brasilia DF  Brazil
Telephone:   +55  61  2105 5000
www.undp-povertycentre.org
povertycentre@undp-povertycentre.org
      November,  2008      Number  71
by Guilherme Issamu Hirata,
International Poverty Centre
Cash Transfers and Child Labour:
An Intriguing Relationship
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes provide cash
to poor households. In return, the households are expected to
meet the conditionalities attached to schooling, among others.
Several evaluations have found positive impacts on primary school
attendance. One issue on which there is a heated debate is the
impact of CCTs on child labour. Because the programmes affect
children’s time allocation, some impact on child labour is always
expected. But it is not as evident as the impact associated with
school attendance.
Besides the lack of child labour-related conditionalities in most
CCT programmes, the impact, if any, depends on a variety of
factors. These include the size of the transfers; the relative amount
of child labour’s monetary and non-monetary contributions;
parents’ preference for education; the type of education-related
conditionalities attached to CCT programmes; and the way those
conditionalities are enforced.
A recent impact evaluation of Paraguay’s CCT pilot programme,
Tekoporã, presents evidence that child labour is positively correlated
to mothers’ labour supply. This seems counterintuitive, since a
frequently cited explanation for child labour is that poor households
rely on it to secure a minimum level of income. Since a household’s
budget constraint decreases when the mother goes to work, it has
been argued, the income generated by the child is less necessary.
Becker’s “Rotten Kid Theorem” can provide one explanation for this
counterintuitive correlation. Roughly speaking, suppose that the
head of a household is altruistic, in the sense that he distributes
the household income among all members instead of keeping the
money for himself (in fact, the money is usually given to the mother
because mothers are thought to be more altruistic than fathers).
Then, according to the theorem, the other household members may
be expected to increase their working activities in order to augment
the household’s income, and consequently their own. In other words,
even children realise that engaging in income-generating activities
would immediately increase their own well-being. This result is
something that has received little attention so far— that a child has
a stake in deciding whether or not to engage in working activities.
In this light, the child’s preferences play a key role in determining
child labour. Instead of assuming that parents send their children to
work, one can think the incentive that drives the mother
to work is the same that influences the child. For instance,
a household might own a small business which, after some
investments, demands a bigger labour force. Both mother and child
may react in the same way by seeing an opportunity to earn income
and going to work in order to meet this demand.
And what if the source of the aforementioned investment is a cash
transfer? The CCT programme has an ambiguous impact on child
labour. On the one hand, the increased opportunity cost of not
attending school implies a reduction in child labour. On the other
hand, there can be a somewhat contrary effect.
The persistence of child labour has different sources. For instance,
it could be seen as a form of skills development. Alternatively,
work might be valued more than schooling if children live in
societies where there is a positive stigma attached to child
labour. However, when the child’s preferences highly determine
whether he or she engages in labour activities, there is another
issue to deal with: children’s preferences could run counter to
parents’ preferences.
If so, the incentive provided by a cash transfer may not be sufficient
to reduce child labour. Indeed, the evaluation of Paraguay’s Tekoporã
revealed that CCT programmes could indirectly stimulate child labour.
Although more evidence needs to be gathered, there are indications
that such a negative outcome might occur. The CCT programme would
have to circumvent this situation.
Brazil’s successful Child Labour Eradication Programme (PETI)
targets working children. It demands that a child stop working in
order for the household to receive benefits. If the objective of CCT
programmes is to fight child labour, then proper targeting, child
labour-related conditionalities, stronger incentives and improved
surveillance are issues that have to be considered. These features of
programme design could also lead to improvements on the supply
side. For instance, more and better schools could be the result of a
rising demand for services.
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